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Abstract 
The strategic management literature has found it difficult to differentiate between 
collusive and efficiency-based synergies in horizontal merger activity. We propose a 
schematic to classify mergers that yields more information on merger types and 
merger effects, and that can, moreover, distinguish between mergers characterized 
largely by collusion-based synergies and mergers characterized largely by effi-
ciency-based synergies. Crucial to the proposed measurement procedure is that it 
encompasses the impact of merger events not only on merging firms – as is custom 
– but also on non-merging competitor firms (the rivals). Employing the event-study 
methodology with stock-market data on samples of large horizontal mergers drawn 
from the US and UK (an Anglo-Saxon sub-sample) and from the European continent, 
we demonstrate how the proposed schematic can better clarify the nature of 
merger activity. 
 
Running Head: Using Rival Effects 
Keywords: acquisitions, event-study, mergers, research methods,  
rivals, synergy 
 
Zusammenfassung  
Die Literatur über strategisches Management hatte bisher Schwierigkeiten, 
zwischen wettbewerbsschädlichen und Effizienz steigenden Synergien bei 
horizontalen Zusammenschlüssen zu differenzieren. Wir schlagen einen 
konzeptionellen Rahmen vor, um Fusionen zu klassifizieren, welcher mehr 
Informationen sowohl über die Fusionstypologie als auch über die Wirkung von 
Zusammenschlüssen entschlüsselt und welcher eine klare Abgrenzung zwischen 
wettbewerbsschädlichen und wettbewerbsfreundlichen Fusionen erlaubt. 
Fundamental für diesen konzeptionellen Rahmen ist, dass er nicht nur die Wirkung 
der Fusion auf die fusionierenden Unternehmen (was typisch in der Literatur ist) 
umfasst, sondern auch ihre Wirkung auf die Rentabilität der Wettbewerber. Wir 
wenden eine Ereignisstudienmethode mit Aktiendaten an, um unsere 
Kategorisierung empirisch umzusetzen. Im Vergleich einer Stichprobe von Fusionen 
in der angelsächsischen Welt (US und Großbritannien) mit Fusionen zwischen 
kontinentaleuropäischen Firmen zeigen wir, wie unsere Methodologie hilfreich sein 
kann, die Art der Fusionsaktivitäten zu identifizieren. 
 
* Corresponding author. We wish to thank Jay Barney, Laurence Capron, Sayan Chatterjee, Wilbur 
Chung, Dave King, and Jo Seldeslachts for helpful discussions; participants at the University of Illinois 
at Urbana-Champaign ‘Organizational Behavior’ seminar for helpful comments; Claudia Baldermann, 
Constanze Quade and Jennifer Rontganger for excellent research assistance. Tomaso Duso gratefully 
acknowledges financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through SFB/TR 15. 
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Introduction 
A vast amount of literature within strategic management has employed the event-study 
methodology (combined with either stock price or accounting data to capture profitability) to 
examine merger and acquisition (M&A) performance – see the extensive reviews by Datta, Pinches 
and Narayanan (1992), King, Dalton, Daily and Covin (2004), and Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, 
Carpenter and Davison (2009). This research has yielded a number of different insights concerning 
the merits of merger activity – i.e., M&As generally benefit target firms but represent break-even 
propositions for acquirer firms – and concerning the drivers of M&A performance: e.g., mergers 
that involve related firms (Rumelt, 1974; Palepu, 1985; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986; Singh & 
Montgomery, 1987; Flanagan, 1996), integration processes (Haspeslagh & Jemison,1991; Pablo,1994; 
Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999), and acquirer experience (Hitt, Harrison & Ireland, 2001; Vermeulen & 
Barkema, 2001; Barkema & Schijven, 2008) are potentially more likely to improve performance. A 
consistent assumption throughout the literature is that a successful – or synergistic – M&A is one 
that generates enhanced profitability for merging firms: by merging firms, we refer to the combined 
acquirer and target (Barney, 1988; Datta, 1991; Lubatkin, 1987). Accordingly, synergistic mergers are 
simply those mergers that lead, for instance, to a net positive gain in the stock prices of merging 
firms (Michel & Shaked, 1985; Weidenbaum & Vogt, 1987; Moeller, Schlingemann & Stulz, 2005). 
 Yet, a number of strategy scholars (e.g., Chatterjee & Lubatkin, 1990; Lubatkin, 1983; Seth, 
1990; Trautwein, 1990) have noted that two broad synergy types exist: collusive synergies (based on 
the market-power implications of reduced competition where prices and profits go up for all firms 
in a market) and efficiency-based synergies (based on a broader set of micro-foundations including 
the operational, managerial, financial and resource-sharing opportunities involved with merging two 
firms).1 Efficiency-based synergies accordingly refer to more than just simple cost-reductions, but 
also to synergies resulting from combining the resources and capabilities of merging firms. While 
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Walter and Barney (1990) point out that market-power and efficiency represent the principal 
motivations behind horizontal merger activity, the researcher cannot distinguish between the 
different synergy types when strictly considering merging firm profitability. Namely, a positive 
abnormal return in the stock price of merging firms identifies the presence of synergies but cannot 
indicate whether these synergies are largely collusive or efficiency based. The inability to separate 
synergy types led, for instance, to Chatterjee (1986) dropping all the horizontal M&As from his 
empirical study in order to eliminate the effect of collusive synergies – since non-horizontal mergers 
involve minimal market-power – and concentrate on efficiency-based synergies. Yet, such a tactic is 
drastic in that many horizontal M&As clearly involve efficiency-based synergies. Even more 
troubling is the trend in organizational scholarship – noticed and empirically refuted by Oxley, 
Sampson and Silverman (2009) – to completely neglect collusive synergies as a relevant and vital 
outcome of merger activity. The proclivity of scholarship to either omit horizontal merger activity 
from study or neglect the potential role of collusive synergies is partly due to the inability to 
differentiate between horizontal mergers that are largely efficiency or collusion based. 
Our aim is to propose a theory-based quantitative means to classify M&A activity that yields 
more information on actual merger types; thus, our contribution involves the advancement of 
measurement procedures. In particular, we provide a methodological approach for future strategic 
management research to more finely delineate between different merger types. Fundamental to our 
proposed methodological approach is the necessity to consider the impact of merger events on both 
merging firms (custom in the literature) and non-merging rival firms (not custom in the literature). 
Accordingly, we extend and improve upon the traditional measurement procedure from the strategy 
literature where researchers simply consider value changes in merging firms in order to determine 
the nature of merger activity (e.g., Lubatkin, 1987; Cannella & Hambrick, 1993; Lubatkin, Srinivasan 
and Merchant, 1997). We do this by taking into account structural insights from industrial 
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organization (IO) theory regarding the impact of strategic actions on the profitability and value of 
competitor firms, and by enhancing the crude conceptualizations in IO concerning efficiency with 
richer theories from strategic management. In this vein, McWilliams, Soegel and Teoh (1999) 
observe (and are concerned in their empirical context) that merger events can affect competitor 
firms – see Oxley et al. (2009) for an assessment of how rare it is in the strategic management 
literature for researchers to examine rival effects.2 Moreover, by simultaneously considering the 
reactions of merging and rival firms to M&A transactions, we are able to show that collusion-based 
synergies (where rivals gain from the merger event) are fundamentally different from efficiency-
based synergies (where rivals are harmed by the merger event). Thus by employing our proposed 
approach to consider both merging firms and non-merging rival firms, the researcher can distinguish 
between mergers largely driven by collusive synergies and mergers largely driven by efficiency-based 
synergies. In short, considering rival effects – in combination with the strategic management 
literature’s traditional focus on acquirer and target profitability – yields critical information on the 
types of mergers being proposed.  
Beyond the heuristic benefits of generating a means for future research to better distinguish 
between different merger types, our proposed schematic responds to additional calls in the 
organizational literature. First, Ketchen, Boyd and Bergh (2008: 646) note that “researchers … 
[have] … struggled with operationalizing the attributes of competitive advantage”. In this vein, we 
follow up on Hitt et al.’s (2001: 58) pinpointing of what distinguishes efficiency-based synergy – 
“creation of synergy results in a competitive advantage for the firm” – by factoring into our 
schematic the only location where competitive advantage can be detected: rival effects. Second, we 
respond to Chatterjee’s (1986) early call to build an analysis encompassing the impact of M&As on 
both merging and rival firms. Chatterjee (1992: 269) noted the potential for a schematic when he 
surmised that “if we simultaneously consider the stock price reactions of the rival and [merging 
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firms] then we can uniquely determine the capital market’s expectations about the … takeover”. 
Thus the seeds – efficiency-based synergies generate a competitive advantage, and the relevance of 
considering rival effects – of such an identification scheme have been present in the literature for 
some time, but have yet to be developed into a full-fledged methodological framework to measure 
the nature of merger activity. 
In order to support our main aim – provide a measurement procedure that factors the 
impact of horizontal mergers on both merging and rival firms in order to improve our 
understanding of M&A activity – we structure the remainder of the paper as follows. First, we 
discuss the methodological, conceptual and theoretical foundations behind our proposed 
measurement procedure. Second, we lay out the methodological schematic by presenting the 
taxonomy of four merger types. Third, we empirically demonstrate the relevance of the schematic by 
employing the event-study methodology with stock price data in a comparison of US and UK 
(Anglo-Saxon) merger activity with Continental-European merger activity. Fourth, we discuss the 
implications of the proposed schematic for the strategic management literature. 
 
Methodological & Conceptual Foundations 
In proposing a methodological approach that yields more information on the nature of 
merger activity, we extend and enhance the approach that has often been employed in the strategy 
literature. The pre-existing literature would generally focus on the impact of a merger event on the 
value and profitability (whether that be measured by stock-price effects, accounting data, or other 
measures) of merging firms (e.g., Lubatkin, 1987; Cannella & Hambrick, 1993; Lubatkin et al., 1997). 
Accordingly, a value-enhancing (or synergistic) merger would be indicated by a positive profit effect 
on merging firms, while a value-decreasing merger would be indicated by a negative profit effect on 
merging firms (Michel & Shaked, 1985; Weidenbaum & Vogt, 1987; Moeller, et al., 2005).3 While 
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many studies would treat the profit-effect on merging firms as a continuous variable, Table 1 
illustrates the simple taxonomy employed to characterize the nature of merger activity. 
-------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------- 
We attempt to improve upon this simple empirically-based methodological framework for 
detecting merger type by adopting basic insights from the theory of industrial organization (IO) and 
enhancing these spartan IO theoretical models with richer insights from strategic management 
theory. The IO field’s primary focus is the nature of competition (prices and quantities) in 
imperfectly competitive markets—markets that exhibit a finite number of competitors, rivalry, and – 
most importantly – strategic interaction between firms (Tirole, 1992). Moreover, strategic interaction 
between firms in imperfectly competitive markets suggests direct links between the actions of one 
firm and the ultimate profitability of competitor firms (Porter, 1985). Interdependence forces firms 
to adapt their market strategies when competitor firms take strategic actions (Chen, 1996), and has 
direct implications with regard to identifying the two types of mergers we focus on here: collusion-
based and efficiency-based synergistic mergers. 
While relatively rich modeling tools have been employed to factor the nature of competition 
and strategic interaction, efficiency effects in IO models have still largely been represented by very 
simplistic reductions in marginal cost. Furthermore, the IO literature essentially ‘black boxes’ 
efficiency effects by not analyzing in depth the source of these efficiency gains. It is in this realm 
where integrating the IO theoretical framework with the strategic management literature is 
particularly useful in improving the theoretical underpinnings of our proposed merger schematic. In 
particular, the simplistic IO idea that efficiency-based gains derive strictly from cost reductions can 
be understood as a reduced form specification that actually results from more complex processes: 
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e.g., via the combination and integration of firm specific resources and capabilities (Barney, 1986; 
Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Peteraf, 1993)—see Boone, 2006 for a rare example of IO theoretical work 
influenced by strategic management insights regarding resource accessing. Furthermore, while 
motivating the existence of efficiency-based synergies with more complex managerial theories, we 
can still use the straightforward logic of IO models to elicit the nature of horizontal merger activity: 
efficiency-based synergies, being merger specific, increase the profitability of merging firms but 
decrease the profitability of rival firms (Farrell & Shapiro, 1990). 
The IO framework also incorporates the presence of collusion-based mergers. The change in 
market structure brought about by a merger of two firms forces all firms in the market to re-
optimize their market strategies. Given the reduced rivalry in the market due to the presence of 
fewer competitors, higher prices and profits result due to a contraction in aggregate output (Salant, 
Switzer & Reynolds, 1983; Denekere & Davidson, 1985; Perry & Porter, 1985; and Farrell & 
Shapiro, 1990). Following in this tradition, Gimeno and Woo (1999: 246) state that rivalry (i.e., more 
competitors) “is commonly reflected in decreased prices for the services provided by a firm”. 
Gimeno and Woo go on to empirically support that a reduction in competition generally leads to 
higher prices and higher profits for firms in a market. One can even further specify the dynamics 
involved with collusive mergers under the two stock models in IO of imperfect competition: 
strategic competition over quantities (Cournot), and strategic competition over prices (Bertrand). In 
particular, merging firms reduce production and rivals increase production – though to a lesser 
degree than the merging firms’ reduction – when quantity is the strategic variable (see Zhang and 
Gimeno (2010) for a representation of this dynamic). Further when price is the strategic variable, 
merging firms raise prices (or equivalently contract production) and rivals – to a lesser degree – raise 
prices (or equivalently contract production). In short, collusion-based mergers enhance the profits of 
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both merging firms and rival firms by altering the market structure and eliciting accommodating 
responses by all firms in the market. 
While the opening passages and the above discussion indicate that rival effects can help 
differentiate between the two M&A types where merging firms gain (collusion-based and efficiency-
based synergistic mergers), it is apparent that such mergers do not represent the full set of merger 
types. As is abundantly clear from the prescriptive literature advising firms not to engage in 
acquisition activity (e.g., Lubatkin et al., 1997; Lubatkin & Lane, 1996; Sirower, 1997), many M&As 
result in merging firms destroying value: i.e., negative profitability effects, as represented by the 
‘value-decreasing’ mergers in Table 1. As Bergh (1997) notes, many value-decreasing mergers 
ultimately lead to divestitures and a damaged reputation for the acquiring firm and its managers. We 
will break down these value-decreasing mergers into two types: non-synergistic (where merging 
firms lose but rivals gain) and pre-emptive (where both merging firms and rivals lose). Nevertheless, 
non-synergistic and pre-emptive mergers can both be nested within an enhanced IO-based 
theoretical framework. For instance, by introducing uncertainty into a standard merger model, 
mergers which ex-ante seem to be profitable on average might end up being unprofitable if the 
expected efficiency-based synergies are not realized (Amir, Diamantoudi & Xue, 2009). In such 
situations, non-synergistic mergers (which enhance rival firm profits) may manifest. Furthermore, 
enhancing the basic IO model to encompass endogenous merger decisions might lead to situations 
where mergers are not profitable for merging firms, yet it is even worse to be an outsider 
(Fridolfsson & Stennek, 2005). In such situations, pre-emptive mergers (where both merging and 
rival firms lose value, but merging firms lose less) may manifest: i.e., merging firms pre-empt an even 
worse situation. 
In sum, basic insights from the theory of industrial organization rest behind our proffered 
methodological schematic for delineating the nature of merger activity. Further, we can improve 
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upon the crude conceptualization of efficiencies in IO theory by embracing richer theories from 
strategic management on leveraging the resources and capabilities of two merged firms in order to 
create competitive advantage. Drawing from these different traditions forms a robust theoretical 
framework with stronger conceptual foundations that allows more confidence in generating a 
merger schematic that advances measurement procedures regarding merger activity. In particular, 
simultaneously factoring the impact of a merger on the profits of merging and rival firms provides 
insight on the true nature of merger activity.  
 
Taxonomy of Merger Activity 
In order to fully factor how mergers impact the profitability of merging firms and non-
merging rivals, it helps to now build our taxonomy of four merger types. While the preceding 
discussion outlining the methodological foundations (the pre-existing empirical approach in strategy 
research to measuring merger performance and categorizing merger activity) and conceptual 
foundations (IO theory enriched with strategic management theory on M&As) sets the basis for our 
proposed methodological approach, the presentation of the four merger types is essential in order to 
illuminate our proposed schematic of merger outcomes. Table 2 illustrates the proposed taxonomy 
of four merger types with respect to their varied effects on merging and rival firms. 
-------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------- 
First, a long-standing rationale behind horizontal mergers is the elimination of competitors 
and facilitation of collusion amongst remaining firms (e.g., Porter, 1985; Stigler, 1964). The core 
dynamic behind these mergers is that the actions by merger insiders to increase prices and/or reduce 
output push the overall prices in the market up to the benefit of rivals. Hence, collusive transactions 
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are beneficial to merger insiders (acquirers and targets) and outsiders (rivals), but come at the 
expense of suppliers and customers. For instance, the $50 billion combination of Total-Fina and 
Elf-Aquitaine eliminated direct competition between these two large French petroleum companies, 
and yielded gains for both the merging firms and their rivals (see the Appendix for this and other 
examples of collusive mergers). Here, merging firms and rivals are competitive complements: the 
competition reduction leads to increased market power which enhances merging firm and rival firm 
profits. As an aside, the collusive elements of horizontal mergers were considered by many scholars 
(e.g., Chatterjee & Lubatkin, 1990; Lubatkin, 1983; Seth, 1990) to be a unique synergy source (along 
with operational) for related mergers and, thus, one of the reasons why related mergers may 
outperform unrelated mergers. Accordingly, mergers falling in the northwest quadrant of Table 2 
can be considered collusion-based synergistic mergers. 
Second, the most widely cited rationale behind horizontal mergers is the search for 
efficiency-based synergies that can be pursued via scale and scope economies, as well as via skill and 
resource sharing between merging firms (Walter & Barney, 1990). Accordingly, M&As that reduce 
costs for merging firms by any metric – scope, scale, or buyer-power – are synergistic mergers. 
Based on the work conceptualizing industries as being characterized by a degree of resource 
heterogeneity and immobility (Barney, 1991), management research has moved beyond a focus on 
cost-based synergies to embrace a richer consideration of synergies with M&As representing a 
means to purchase resources that could not otherwise be accessed (Barney, 1986; Dierickx & Cool, 
1989; Peteraf, 1993). More specifically, acquisitions provide bidders with new products, assets and 
skills which may be used to serve both new and pre-existing customers. For instance, Capron (1999) 
considers how resource redeployment post-acquisition can enhance M&A performance. In this vein, 
Hitt et al. (2001: 82) argue that the joining of “complementary resources between an acquiring and 
acquired firm can create synergies that, in turn, generate a competitive advantage for the firm over 
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its competitors”. As they infer, efficiency-based synergistic mergers are fundamentally different to 
collusion-based synergistic mergers in that rivals indicate negative – not positive – profit-effects for 
such mergers.  
With efficiency-based synergistic mergers, rival firms and merging firms represent 
competitive substitutes: the M&A involves the joining of resources and capabilities that gives 
merging firms an advantage vis-à-vis rivals, thus the M&A represents a competitive threat to rivals. 
It is important to underscore again that we do not restrict efficiency-based synergies to merger 
induced reductions in cost structure. In keeping with the richer strategic management theories, we 
also include the leveraging of resources, complementarities and capabilities between merging firms, 
as well as mergers that result in substantial buyer power for merging firms. For instance, Boeing’s 
1997 acquisition of McDonnell Douglas (Hill, 2011: 302-307) represents a merger where the 
combination of resources (complementary product lines) yielded a competitive advantage vis-à-vis 
rival firms (e.g., Airbus)—see the Appendix for examples of other efficiency-based mergers. 
Accordingly, mergers falling in the southwest quadrant of Table 2 (where merging firms gain, but 
rivals lose) can be considered efficiency-based synergistic mergers. 
Third, it is well understood that targets reap the majority of M&A gains while acquirers 
usually break-even but often experience value losses (Andrade, Mitchell & Stafford, 2001; King et 
al., 2004); moreover, sometimes acquirer value losses are so substantial that the net effect on the 
merging firms represents a loss (i.e., acquirer losses outweigh any potential target gains). Here, we 
highlight the existence of value-decreasing mergers: indicated by a net-negative change in 
profitability for merging firms. A number of explanations for the existence of such mergers have 
been posited: e.g., empire-building – managerial incentives to grow the company at shareholder 
expense (Mueller, 1969; Walsh, 1988; Weidenbaum & Vogt, 1987); managerial-hubris – managerial 
expectations are systematically upward biased (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986; Roll, 1986); as well as 
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information processing constraints in the Simon (1957) tradition, and internal political games in the 
Pettigrew (1977) tradition. Further, when firms compete as competitive substitutes, value-decreasing 
mergers represent an opportunity for non-merging rivals. The M&A does not involve sufficient 
joining of resources and capabilities, thus the merged firm has no advantage vis-à-vis rival firms. In 
fact, the internal integration challenges of such a merger (Birkinshaw, Bresman & Håkanson, 2000; 
Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999; Larsson & Lubatkin, 2001) could encumber the firm in strategic 
competition – recall that managerial time and cognition come in limited quantities – to the 
advantage of rivals. For instance, the AOL/Time-Warner merger from 1999 involved substantial 
integration challenges that led to – even controlling for the burst in the dot-com bubble – substantial 
decreases in profitability for the merging parties, while providing a competitive advantage to more 
traditional media companies (e.g., Vivendi, CBS, Viacom, and others). These types of mergers are 
the reciprocal of efficiency-based synergistic mergers: just as a merger which enhances efficiency will 
threaten rivals, a merger which decreases the efficiency (or competitiveness) of merging firms 
represents a competitive boon to rivals. In short, the value-destroying nature of such mergers creates 
competitive opportunities for enhancing rival firm profitability and performance. Accordingly, 
mergers falling in the northeast quadrant of Table 2 (where merging firms lose, but rivals gain) can 
be considered non-synergistic mergers. 
Fourth, some value-decreasing mergers actually generate competitive losses for both merging 
and rival firms. In this class of M&As, the merging and rival firms can be considered competitive 
complements; i.e., the merger is value-decreasing for both parties. Such ‘destructive’ mergers were 
traditionally difficult to explain; though, recent research on the nature of pre-emptive mergers (e.g., 
Akdogu, 2003; Brito, 2003; Fridolfsson & Stennek, 2005; Molnar, 2007) helps shed light on the 
dynamics behind some of these mergers. Essentially, if losing a target to a competitor means you 
would experience a substantial competitive loss, then it may make sense to over-bid and receive a 
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negative return: i.e., the acquiring firm’s losses are not as large as they would have been had they 
been an outsider to the merger. These pre-emptive mergers provide a logic as to why rational 
shareholder-valuing managers might pursue value-decreasing mergers. Furthermore, Molnar (2007) 
notes that when submitting a bid reveals negative news about an industry (e.g., the presence of cost 
or demand shocks), pre-emption results in a decreased aggregate value for the merging firms. For 
example, Kimberly-Clark’s acquisition of Scott Paper in 1995 resulted in a loss for the shareholders 
of the two merging firms; yet in light of the declining nature of the paper goods industry, this M&A 
yielded even greater losses to the rival firms not participating in the merger—see the Appendix for 
other ‘pre-emptive’ mergers.  It should be pointed out that many mergers here (where the acquiring 
firms experience larger losses than rival firms) do not conform to the pre-emption premise; instead, 
these mergers must simply be considered value-destroying due to managerial failure of one kind or 
another. Nevertheless, we categorize M&As that generate net-negative profitability changes for 
merging and rival firms as pre-emptive mergers even though that does not cover all the transaction 
types embedded in this category. Accordingly, mergers falling in the southeast quadrant of Table 2 
(where merging and rival firms lose) can be considered pre-emptive mergers. 
The above discussion shows how variations in the impact of transactions on merging and 
rival firms’ profitability can provide an indication of the M&A’s true nature. However, it bears 
pointing out here that specific mergers will potentially involve elements of different merger types: 
e.g., many M&As involve both efficiency-based and collusion-based elements (Kim & Singal, 1993). 
Yet, the profit effect indicates which element dominates: the net effect. For example, an M&A 
where merging firms elicit positive profitability effects may involve both collusive and efficiency-
based synergies, yet if rivals elicit a negative profit effect then the efficiency-based elements of the 
transaction dominate the collusive elements. For instance, the efficiency-based Boeing/McDonnell-
Douglas pairing noted above also surely involved some collusive effects due to the reduction in 
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competition; however, the efficiency-effects involved with the merger evidently swamped the 
collusive-effects. Likewise, if rivals elicit a positive profit effect then the collusive elements of the 
transaction dominate the efficiency-based elements. Accordingly, our schematic provides a direct 
means – factoring rival and merging firm effects – to disentangle mergers that are ‘dominantly’ 
collusion-based from mergers that are ‘dominantly’ efficiency-based mergers, and to disentangle the 
two value-decreasing merger types (non-synergistic and pre-emptive). 
 
Empirical Demonstration 
Our proposed schematic is general in that it is conceptually based on the transaction-induced 
profitability effects (i.e., the impact of the merger on value and profits) for merging and rival firms. 
Empirical operationalizations could accordingly use stock price data (both short-run and long-run 
event-windows) as well as accounting and survey-based data to capture the profitability and 
performance of the merger. Our own empirical demonstration will employ stock price data based on 
relatively long short-term windows. As McWilliams and Siegel (1997), McWilliams et al. (1999), and 
Haleblian et al. (2009) attest, the principal advantage of a short-term window approach is that stock 
price changes are better attributed to the event and less subject to confounding effects (i.e., keeping 
the window narrow ensures against the presence of other major events being the source of any 
abnormal return). Nevertheless, the advantage with longer event windows is that more information 
concerning the event can be impounded by the financial market: e.g., whether the executives of 
target firms will be retained post-acquisition (Bergh, 2001).  
In our methodological context, it is important to expand the event-window beyond a very 
narrow 3-days (from 1 day before until 1 day after the event), as we consider both the reaction of 
merging firms and rival firms to an event. It stands to reason that it will take more time to impound 
the effects of a merger on the stock prices of rival firms, as financial markets must first ascertain the 
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nature of the merger itself, then calculate the nature of competition and rivalry in the market, and 
finally factor the impact of the merger on rival firms. While the above suggests extending the event-
window beyond one day after the event, the potential for information leakages also suggests 
extending the event-window prior to the event. Information leakages are particularly pertinent given 
the nature of our merger sample: very large horizontal combinations that undergo an automatic 
antitrust vetting. Thus, the likelihood that information leaks to the market prior to the official 
merger announcement is quite high (e.g., Ellert, 1976). Beyond these intuitive rationales behind 
expanding the event-window, auxiliary empirical evidence suggests that the 56-day window (from 50 
days before until 5 days after the event) yields the tightest correlation with the actual change in 
accounting-based profits earned by merging and rival firms in the three to five years subsequent to 
the merger.4 
Using the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for merging firms and rival firms over a 56-day 
window, we then classify particular M&As into the four merger types illustrated in Table 2. Notice 
that we consider the abnormal returns of merging firms (acquirer plus target) in order to sidestep the 
whole issue as to which of these two firms captures the majority of the transaction value (Singh & 
Montgomery, 1987; Barney, 1988; Sirower, 1997; Andrade, et al., 2001; Moeller et al., 2005). While it 
is generally an important question as to whether the acquirer or target earns the majority of the value 
created by a merger (see Datta et al., 1992, King et al., 2004, and Haleblian et al., 2009 for reviews) 
the focus here is simply on whether the merger actually created value and not on who gets that 
value. Accordingly, each empirical observation represents a pairing between the two merging firms 
and the relevant set of rivals for the transaction. We also enlarge the proposed taxonomy to include 
an extra empirical category labeled ‘no effect’: cases where the CARs are not statistically different 
from zero (within one standard error around zero). 
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The basic idea behind the event-study method employing short-run financial market data is 
that any event-induced change to the value and profitability of the focal firm(s) will be reflected in 
changes to the stock price of this firm (see McWilliams & Siegel, 1997 for more details). Thus, we 
can graft our proposed schematic on to a sample of horizontal merger activity while employing the 
event-study methodology in order to delineate between different M&A types. Therefore, when 
employing the event-study methodology with stock price data, we can classify mergers as follows:  
• mergers that generate net-positive abnormal returns to merging firms (acquirers and targets) 
and a net-positive abnormal return to rival firms can be considered collusion-based 
synergistic mergers, 
• mergers that generate net-positive abnormal returns to merging firms (acquirers and targets) 
and a net-negative abnormal return to rival firms can be considered efficiency-based 
synergistic mergers, 
• mergers that generate net-negative abnormal returns to merging firms (acquirers and targets) 
and a net-positive abnormal return to rival firms can be considered non-synergistic mergers, 
• mergers that generate net-negative abnormal returns to merging firms (acquirers and targets) 
and a net-negative abnormal return to rival firms can be considered pre-emptive mergers. 
 
Data  
Our sample captures large horizontal M&As that occurred within the 1990-2002 period and 
affected European product markets. The sample was drawn from those merger transactions 
automatically analyzed by the European Commission (EC) for antitrust implications.5 The chief 
advantage to drawing our sample from the mergers analyzed by EC officials is that Commission 
experts have identified the relevant competitors (rivals) for every M&A, thus yielding an accurate 
assessment of rival identity. The expert assessment of rival identity represents a particular strength of 
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this sample, as much of the finance-based literature that analyzes the impact of mergers on rivals 
simply defines rivals as those firms sharing the same industry classification (e.g., Eckbo, 1983; Song 
& Walkling, 2000; Fee & Thomas, 2004). Yet sharing the same industry does not equate to actually 
competing against merging firms in a particular market; hence, the expert assessment of rival-identity 
allows assessing the effect of mergers on rivals much more precisely than most previous work. While 
Shahrur (2005) takes a novel approach by employing input-output account data in order to identify 
buyer and seller firms, this identification of customers, suppliers, and rivals is still based on industry 
classifications. Thus, rival-firm identification represents a substantial strength to our particular 
sample and approach.6  
For the strict purpose of illustrating the heuristic benefits of our merger schematic, we will 
focus on two different sub-samples: one based on US and UK merger activity (Anglo-Saxon), and 
one based on intra-European merger activity that excludes merger participants from the UK 
(Continental European). To be specific, the Anglo-Saxon M&As consist of transactions where either 
a US or UK firm was involved in the merger as either an acquirer or target, while Continental-
European M&As consist of transactions where both the acquirer and target hail from the European 
continent. Furthermore, we identified and obtained usable data (stock price information on the 
relevant acquiring, target and rival firms) for 58 Anglo-Saxon and 46 Continental-European 
transactions. Thus we were conscious to balance McWilliams and Siegel’s (1997) recommendations – 
elimination of observations with confounding events, and ensuring as large a sample as possible – 
concerning the use of the event-study methodology in organizational research. 
One of the crucial issues in event studies is the determination of the moment when the 
information about the merger hits the market (McWilliams et al., 1999). In line with standard 
practice (e.g., Banerjee & Eckard, 1998), we define the merger announcement date to be the first day 
in which rumors about a particular merger appeared in the international press. Hence, for each of 
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the mergers in our sample, we used ‘Dow Jones Interactive’ – a customizable business news and 
research product that integrates content from newspapers, newswires, journals, research reports and 
web sites – to identify the event date.7 The necessary stock market data for the relevant firms were 
downloaded from ‘Datastream’. In particular, we collected daily stock returns (Ri,t) and market values 
(MVit) for all merging and rival firms, as well as information on a market return (Rm,t) for each firms’ 
industry sector (where i refers to the firm, m to the specific sector, and t to time). 
 
Event-Study Methodology 
With the above data at hand, we follow the standard stock market event-study methodology 
by calculating the abnormal returns corresponding to a merger announcement. The abnormal return 
for firm i around the mergers’ announcement day t (ARi,t) is defined as ititti RRAR ˆ, −= , where ( itRˆ ) 
is the return for the scenario in which the merger would not have been announced. This 
counterfactual variable is not observable and must therefore be estimated. Hence, by using the 
market model, we first define the ‘normal return’ for each firm as titmiiti RR ,,, εβα ++= , where firm 
i’s stock return at time t ( tiR , ) is assumed to be proportional to a market return ( tmR , ) and ti,ε is an 
i.i.d. normally distributed error term. We then estimate this equation over a 240-day trading period – 
ending 60 days prior to the announcement date – while using the Scholes and Williams (1977) 
method. After obtaining estimates for the model’s parameters α and β, we can build the 
counterfactual estimate of the stock price in the event where the merger would not have been 
announced: tmiiit RR ,ˆˆˆ βα += . 
Following the literature, and to account for possible information leakages – which influence 
firm i’s return before (or after) the merger announcement – we define the CAR to be the sum of the 
daily abnormal returns within an event-window spanning from τ1 (50) days before the event to τ2 (5) 
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where fjI  is the number of merging – or rival – firms involved in merger j. Thus, the CARs for 
merging firms and rival firms represent weighted averages of the composite firms (see McWilliams et 
al., 1999 for more description of the event-study method). 
Table 3 reports the mean CARs for all relevant firm types using our employed event-window 
of 56-days over the different merger samples (Continental-European, Anglo-Saxon and All 
Mergers). The sample means broadly conform to the well-established stylized facts (e.g., Andrade et 
al., 2001; King et al., 2004) concerning merger activity: targets reap substantial gains with positive 
and significant CARs, acquirers tend to break even by indicating CARs insignificantly different from 
zero, and merging firms as a whole generate slightly positive CARs. 
-------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
-------------------------- 
Empirical Results 
Using our proposed schematic in conjunction with the stock-price measures obtained via the 
event-study method allows building tables that illustrate the merits of our methodological approach 
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to classifying mergers. Table 4 presents the merger taxonomy based on the Anglo-Saxon mergers. 
Reflecting the importance of the proposed conceptual framework, Table 4 illustrates the non-
negligible presence of all kinds of mergers in the sample: i.e., collusion-based synergistic (22.41% of 
the sample), efficiency-based synergistic (25.86% of the sample), non-synergistic (15.52%) and pre-
emptive (24.14%) all exist. Furthermore, 48.28% of the merging firm observations experience a 
significant positive CAR, whereas 44.83% experience a significant negative CAR. 
-------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------- 
Moreover, we would like to compare this sample of Anglo-Saxon merger activity with 
another sample of mergers in order to illustrate the relevance of our merger schematic. Thus, table 5 
presents the merger taxonomy based on the sub-sample of Continental-European merger activity. 
Notice that the Anglo-Saxon and Continental-European sub-samples yield very similar results with 
regard to how often merging firms’ experience a significant positive CAR: 48.28% for the Anglo-
Saxon sample, and 47.83% for the Continental-European sample. If we were to have no information 
on rival effects – akin to the traditional approach in the strategic management M&A literature – then 
we would argue that the M&As in these two samples are generally identical in terms of synergistic 
tendencies; i.e., Anglo-Saxon and Continental-European M&As appear to be equally synergistic. Yet 
factoring the impact of these mergers on rival firms (i.e. employing our proposed schematic) tells us 
quite a bit more. Collusion-based synergistic mergers represent 28.26% of the Continental-European 
sample, but only 22.41% of the Anglo-Saxon sample; further, efficiency-based synergistic mergers 
represent 17.39% of the Continental-European sample, and 25.86% of the Anglo-Saxon sample. In 
short, efficiency-based synergistic mergers are relatively more prevalent in Anglo-Saxon merger 
activity; and, collusion-based synergistic mergers are relatively more prevalent in Continental-
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European merger activity; though, it should be noted that these differences are only statistically 
significant at a tolerant 20% level.8 Accordingly, the synergistic Anglo-Saxon mergers tend to be 
characterized less by collusive synergies and more by the attainment of efficiency-based synergies. 
Hence, Anglo-Saxon mergers appear to involve the optimal redeployment of resources between 
merging firms that actually leads to the creation of a competitive advantage vis-à-vis rivals, whereas 
the Continental-European mergers appear to simply require the reaping of benefits from the 
reduction of competition in a market. 
-------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
-------------------------- 
Comparing the Anglo-Saxon and Continental-European samples for the non-
synergistic/pre-emptive distinction also proves to be illustrative; though, the differences are again 
not statistically significant. We see that non-synergistic mergers – where the M&A decreases the 
performance of merging firms and actually enhances rival firm performance – represent 19.57% of 
Continental-European merger activity, but only 15.52% of Anglo-Saxon merger activity. The relative 
scarcity of non-synergistic mergers in the Anglo-Saxon sub-sample is important, as these mergers 
indicate substantial failure on the part of managers. Furthermore, the broadly labeled pre-emptive 
mergers – where the managers of merging firms may be valuing shareholders by attempting to 
mitigate losses – represent 28.26% of Continental-European and 24.14% of Anglo-Saxon merger 
activity. Taking a closer look at the data to consider which M&A events actually indicate smaller 
losses for merging firms as compared to rival firms (i.e., a truly pre-emptive result), we see that five 
of the Anglo-Saxon mergers and five of the Continental-European mergers were truly pre-emptive; 
thus, no substantial difference in the tendency to undertake pre-emptive mergers is indicated. 
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In sum, the results from the empirical demonstration of our proposed schematic tentatively 
suggest that Anglo-Saxon mergers are more shareholder-valuing than Continental-European 
mergers. While Anglo-Saxon and Continental-European merger activity are equally synergistic in 
terms of merging firms’ profitability (i.e., around 48% of the mergers in both samples indicate 
significantly positive abnormal returns), the synergistic Anglo-Saxon mergers are largely 
characterized by the attainment of efficiency-based synergies as compared to the Continental-
European mergers which are more characterized by the attainment of collusive synergies. 
Furthermore, the Anglo-Saxon merger activity exhibits fewer non-synergistic mergers: where the 
M&A generates losses for merging firms but, incredibly, gains for rival firms. It is imperative to 
underscore that such distinctions in the two samples of merger activity would be impossible to 
detect when employing the traditional approach of strictly focusing on the profitability of merging 
firms (e.g., acquirer and target). Only by employing our proposed schematic (where the researcher 
simultaneously considers merging firm and rival firm effects) can such distinctions be made.  
 
Implications 
We begin to address Chatterjee’s (1986) call for a more rigorous conceptual framework on 
merger activity that embraces the full effects of merger events: i.e., the impact on both merging and 
non-merging rival firms. Moreover, the different competitive effects of M&As on merging and rival 
firms drives the identification of the different merger types in our proposed schematic. If one were 
to assume that merger motives align with merger outcomes, then rival effects also help us 
differentiate between mergers where the motive is generally softer rivalry in a market (i.e., collusion-
based synergistic mergers) and mergers where the motive is generally competitive in nature (i.e., 
efficiency-based synergistic mergers). In addition, rival effects help us differentiate between mergers 
where the motive is often hubris or empire-building in nature (i.e., non-synergistic mergers) and 
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mergers where the motive tends to be rational and shareholder-valuing (i.e., pre-emptive mergers). 
Without considering rival effects, we simply could not make these distinctions. The efficacy of these 
distinctions underscores Oxley et al.’s (2009: 1322) point that “examining the effect of one firm’s 
action on the abnormal returns earned by its rivals … is quite novel in strategy research and … can 
be usefully applied”. 
The sub-point regarding the importance of rival effects in helping better illuminate the 
nature of merger activity can be borne out further. As already noted, focusing strictly on merging 
firm performance does not allow teasing apart collusion-based synergistic mergers from efficiency-
based synergistic mergers: both types positively impact merging firms, but only efficiency-based 
mergers negatively impact rival firms. Consider, for instance, how the managerial challenges 
involved with these two types of mergers are quite different: collusive mergers simply require the 
killing off of a competitor and the subsequent reaping of gains from reduced rivalry, while 
efficiency-based mergers require sophisticated integration of resource bundles a la Barney (1986) and 
Capron (1999) – integration so successful that rival firms find themselves at a disadvantage with 
regard to the merged entity. For example, our empirical demonstration tentatively indicates that 
Anglo-Saxon M&As tend – relatively – to consist of more truly synergistic activity (i.e., efficiency-
based mergers that generate a competitive advantage) than do Continental-European M&As. 
Accordingly, by defining merger types in this fashion we gain insight into the potential managerial 
challenges involved with a specific merger transaction. 
Furthermore, value-decreasing transactions that reduce merging firms’ profitability and 
performance are often considered failures on the part of management due to empire-building, 
managerial-hubris or information-processing problems (Lubatkin, 1983). Hence, mergers that 
generate a net-negative impact on merging firms (e.g., a net-negative CAR) have traditionally been 
lumped into the value-decreasing merger category and considered the result of managerial failure. 
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Yet pre-emptive mergers are fundamentally different from non-synergistic mergers. Pre-emptive 
mergers actually involve shareholder valuing management, but in this case management must engage 
in strategic actions (i.e., a merger) that decrease performance and profitability in order to protect 
shareholders from what would be a greater loss if the firm were left outside of merger activity. 
Taking rival effects into account allows distinguishing between these two fundamentally different 
merger types (non-synergistic and pre-emptive) with seemingly different managerial challenges. 
Delineating merger type via a transaction’s impact on both merging and rival firms may also 
help explain the mixed findings in the empirical literature concerning merger activity. The King et al. 
(2004) study clarifies the inability of the empirical literature to consistently and repeatedly converge 
upon the drivers of M&A performance. Accordingly, the authors conclude that a missing moderator 
of merger performance exists, as “researchers simply may not be looking at the ‘right’ set of 
variables as predictors” (King et al., 2004: 197). Our proposed schematic might proffer a solution to 
this puzzle as it could explain the inconsistency in the empirical literature: i.e., identify one of those 
missing moderators. In particular, the predictors of M&A success (relatedness, experience, 
integration, etc.) may fundamentally differ for different merger types, thus explaining the 
inconsistency in the results concerning M&A performance drivers. For instance, acquisition 
experience could be fundamental for efficiency-based mergers that seek to re-deploy resources in an 
optimal manner, but acquisition experience may be ineffectual for collusive mergers that simply seek 
the reduction of competition in a market. Thus, we anticipate a number of potential future research 
avenues where the proposed schematic can be employed. 
Most importantly, we hope that our proposed schematic will be employed by future 
researchers desiring to elicit a finer classification of the nature of merger activity. One can first 
imagine similar comparisons of merger activity in different geographic regions being of interest to 
corporate governance (e.g., Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Gugler, Mueller & Yurtoglu, 2004) and 
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institutionalist scholars (e.g., Hall & Soskice, 2001), as the existence of substantially different merger 
types in different regions and countries would support the merits of focusing on the presence of 
cross-national institutional heterogeneity. For instance, the evident differences in our two sub-
samples of merger activity potentially bear out Haleblian’s (2009) observation that macro-level 
factors – like national culture and legalistic traditions – may influence the nature of merger activity.  
Most importantly, we anticipate that our merger schematic can replace the proclivity of the 
strategy literature to simply consider the impact of a merger on the performance (often captured by 
the event-study method) of merging firms. Thus instead of focusing simply on the drivers of 
merging firms’ value and profits, future empirical scholarship with theoretically generated 
hypotheses could consider the factors determining the different merger types. Such research would 
necessarily involve the coupling of our proposed approach to classifying merger activity along with 
multinomial logit analysis (e.g., Long, 1987) in order to properly deal with the categorical nature of 
the dependent variable. While the strategic management literature has customarily employed the 
abnormal returns of merging firms as a dependent variable and then considered the various drivers 
of merger value, the implicit argument here is that such efforts will involve spurious causal 
inferences in light of the measurement error involved with simply considering the performance of 
merging firms. Only by better measuring the nature of merger activity (i.e., considering the impact of 
the merger on rival firms as well as merging firms) can organizational researchers truly converge on 
the actual drivers of M&A performance and outcomes.  
 
Conclusion 
Motivated by the inability in the strategic management literature to differentiate between 
collusive and efficiency-based synergies, we build a methodological framework that yields more 
information on merger type. The proposed schematic departs from the customary approach in the 
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empirical literature to simply focus on how M&As impact merging firms (i.e., the acquirer and 
target) by also considering how mergers impact rival firms. In particular, by analyzing rival firm 
effects – in combination with the traditional focus on merging firm effects – we can differentiate 
between collusion-based and efficiency-based synergistic mergers (the two value-increasing M&A 
types for merging firms) and between non-synergistic and pre-emptive mergers (the two value-
decreasing M&A types for merging firms). Simply put, the reaction of rival firms to merger events 
yields critical information on the nature of the proposed transaction. We empirically demonstrate the 
relevance of the proposed schematic on merger samples drawn from the US and UK (Anglo-Saxon) 
and the European continent, and show that differences in Continental-European and Anglo-Saxon 
merger activity only become manifest once rival effects are considered. Thus, we urge strategic 
management scholarship to begin to heed Chatterjee’s (1986, 1992) early call to consider rival 
effects, as the impact of a merger on rival firms – in combination with the impact on merging firms 
– provides salient information regarding the true nature of the transaction. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 Some scholars (e.g., Trautwein 1990) consider buyer-power mergers (which lower merging firms’ 
input prices) to reflect collusive-synergy. We consider these mergers to be efficiency-based as the 
impact of such M&As is lower costs for merging firms. Thus in our context, collusive mergers 
significantly lower competition in a horizontal market, and potentially lead to reduced rivalry and 
greater pricing power vis-à-vis customers. 
2 McGahan and Silverman’s (2006) study on how granted-patents impact rival-firms, and Clougherty 
and Duso’s (2009) contention that rival firms generally gain from mergers represent two exceptions 
to this point. Yet, Fosfuri and Giarratana (2009) observe that the same neglect for rival-effects is 
present in the marketing literature. 
3 It should be noted that the survey method has been employed by many organizational researchers 
in order to determine merger type. Yet empiricists have been concerned about the potential for 
measurement error and biases when it comes to relying on respondent opinion (Newbert, 2007). For 
instance, Bruner (2002) notes that managers overwhelmingly find their own firms to engage in 
synergistic M&A activity, despite the fact that such strategies are break-even propositions at best.  
4 We were able to collect balance sheet data from Standard & Poor’s ‘Global Vantage’ database for a 
sub-sample of our merging and rival firms. This allowed the creation of a post-merger profitability 
measure for both merging and rival firms. In particular, the measure takes the reported profit levels 
over total asset levels for merging and rival firms, and then compares that measure with a 
counterfactual measure of this variable (i.e., what that measure should be in the absence of the 
merger event). We define the counterfactual in a manner akin to Duso, Gugler and Yurtoglu (2010) 
where they use the development of profits over total assets for the median firm (in terms of 
profitability) in the same 3-digit SIC industry that merging and rival firms operate. We then calculate 
the development of profits from three to five years after the merger in order to control for transitory 
post-acquisition integration challenges (Clougherty & Moliterno, 2010). When estimating a table of 
correlation coefficients, we find that the abnormal returns calculated using a longer (50,5) event-
window indicate a much tighter – and statistically significant – relationship with post-merger 
profitability than do shorter event-windows. Thus, the longer short-term event-window appears to 
indicate greater construct validity, as it converges on another operationalization (accounting-based 
profit effects) that theory suggests it should be similar with. 
 27 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 EU merger regulations mandate notification when the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of 
merging firms exceeds 5 billion Euros or when the combined aggregate EU-wide turnover of 
merging firms exceeds 250 million Euros. Therefore, these M&As have undergone a mandatory 
investigation by the EC—an investigation automatically triggered because the merger size exceeded 
the notification thresholds. Thus by not picking up the small mergers that do not require 
notification, the sample is characterized by relatively large horizontal merger activity. However, the 
robustness of the results to various sub-samples based on different antitrust-scrutiny levels suggests 
that the sample is not defined by anti-competitive mergers where collusion-based motivations would 
consistently prevail. Note also that Lubatkin et al. (1997) find that changes in antitrust scrutiny levels 
do not appear to change the nature of merger activity in an economy as measured by cumulative 
abnormal returns. 
6 See Duso, Neven and Röller (2007), Clougherty and Duso (2009), and Duso et al. (2010) for 
examples of empirical studies that draw a merger sample from the EC for similar benefits. 
7 In order to ensure the accuracy of these dates, we obtained the announcement dates from 
Thomson Reuters SDC database for a large sub-sample of our mergers. These dates correspond for 
almost all of our mergers, and the difference is minimal for the few mergers where the dates do not 
exactly correspond. 
8 The lack of statistical significance is in part due to the limited sample on which we run our tests for 
differences in means, and is also due in part to the nature of the merger taxonomy as differences 
between samples will not be huge. 
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Appendix 
Sample of Merger Activity sorted by Classification of Merger Type 
 
Acquirer Target Sample Year 
Collusion-Based Synergistic Mergers 
Cyanamid Shell Anglo 1993 
Crown Cork & Seal  Carnaudmetalbox Sa Anglo 1995 
Coca-Cola Enterprises Cadbury Schweppes Anglo 1996 
Guinness Grand Metropolitan Anglo 1997 
Worldcom MCI Anglo 1997 
Dow Jones General Electric Anglo 1997 
Commercial Union Plc General Accident Plc Anglo 1997 
Ingram Tech Data Anglo 1998 
Bp Amoco Plc. Atlantic Richfield  Anglo 1999 
Dow Chemical Union Carbide Anglo 1999 
Unilever PLC Bestfood Anglo 2000 
United Airlines US Airways Group Inc. Anglo 2000 
H.J. Heinz Company CSM NV Anglo 2001 
Fiat Alcatel Cont. 1990 
Viag Continental Can Cont. 1991 
Nestle' Eaux Vittel Cont. 1992 
Mannesmann Hoesch Cont. 1992 
Schneider Electric S.A. AEG A.G. Cont. 1994 
Man Ingersoll Rand Cont. 1994 
Thyssen Stahl Acciai Speciali Asti Cont. 1994 
Saint Gobain Hoechst Wacker Cont. 1996 
Total Fina Elf Aquitaine Cont. 1999 
Framatome Siemens Cont. 2000 
Metsä-Serla Corporation Modo Cont. 2000 
Stinnes AG (E.ON AG) Holland Chemical Cont. 2000 
Fabricom GTI Cont. 2001 
Efficiency-Based Synergistic Mergers 
Digital Equipment Int. Mannesmann Anglo 1991 
Du Pont Imperial Chemical Ind. Anglo 1992 
Asea Brown Boveri Trafalgar Hse Anglo 1992 
Fletcher Challenge Methanex Anglo 1993 
British Telecom MCI (Ii) Anglo 1997 
Boeing McDonnell Douglas Anglo 1997 
Exxon Corporation Mobil Corporation Anglo 1999 
Astra Zeneca Anglo 1999 
ACCOR  S.A. The BLACKSTONE  Anglo 1999 
Alcan Aluminium Lcd. Alusuisse Lonza Anglo 1999 
Emc Data General Anglo 1999 
Boeing Hughes Electronics Anglo 1999 
Ashland Superfos Anglo 1999 
Cendant Corporation Galileo International Anglo 2001 
Flextronics International Xerox Corporation Anglo 2001 
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Acquirer Target Sample Year 
Efficiency-Based Synergistic Mergers 
Alcatel Cable S.A. Aeg Kabel Cont. 1991 
Orkla As Volvo Cont. 1995 
Fortis Abn-Amro Bank Cont. 1997 
Roche Boehringer Mannheim Cont. 1997 
Linde AG AGA AB Cont. 1999 
Ab Volvo Scania Ab Cont. 1999 
Vivendi S.A. Canal+ S.A. Cont. 2000 
UPM-Kymmene Haindl Cont. 2001 
Non-Synergistic Mergers 
Ingersoll Rand Co. Dresser Inc. Anglo 1991 
Uap Transatlantic HDG. Anglo 1991 
Coca Cola Carslberg A/S Anglo 1996 
At&T TCI Anglo 1998 
Getronics N.V. Wang Laboratories Anglo 1999 
Du Pont  Hoechst Anglo 1999 
AOL Time Warner Anglo 1999 
Ford Motor Company Autonova AB Anglo 2000 
General Electric Corp. Honeywell Anglo 2000 
Ericsson Ascom Cont. 1992 
CCF BHF Cont. 1994 
Siemens Italtel Cont. 1994 
Ciba-Geigy Sandoz Cont. 1996 
ALSTOM ABB Cont. 1999 
SCA Mölnlycke Holding Metsä Tissue Corp. Cont. 2000 
Matra Marconi Space Astrium Cont. 1999 
Svedala Industri AB Metso Corporation Cont. 2000 
Deutsche Shell GmbH RWE AG Cont. 2001 
Pre-emptive Mergers 
AT&T Ncr Corporation Anglo 1990 
Commercial Union Suez Anglo 1994 
Gencor Lonmin Anglo 1995 
Kimberly-Clark Scott Paper Anglo 1995 
Anglo American Corp. Lonmin Anglo 1996 
Thyssen Krupp Stahl Itw Signode Anglo 1997 
General Electric Finmeccanica Anglo 1998 
AT&T MediaOne Group Anglo 1999 
ACCOR  S.A. The BLACKSTONE Anglo 1999 
Alcoa Inc. Reynolds Metals Anglo 1999 
MCI WorldCom Sprint Anglo 1999 
Novartis AG AstraZeneca Plc. Anglo 1999 
GE Capital Corporation Heller Financial, Inc Anglo 2001 
General Electric Company Unison Industries Inc. Anglo 2002 
Accor Wagons-Lits Cont. 1991 
Shell Montedison Cont. 1993 
Knp Buehrmann Tetterode Cont. 1993 
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Acquirer Target Sample Year 
Pre-emptive Mergers 
Mannesmann Vlourec  Dalmine Cont. 1993 
Union Carbide Enichem S.P.A. Cont. 1995 
Siemens Lagardere Cont. 1996 
Cardo Thyssen Cont. 1996 
Siemens Elektrowatt Cont. 1997 
Schneider Legrand Cont. 2000 
De Beers LVMH Cont. 2001 
UPM-Kymmene Haindl Cont. 2001 
Koninklijke KPN N.V. E-Plus Cont. 2002 
Vendex KBB Nederland Brico Belgium S.A. Cont. 2002 
No-Effect Mergers 
Ingersoll Rand Co. Dresser Inc. Anglo 1991 
Digital Equipment Corp. Philips Electronics Anglo 1991 
Chs Electronics Inc. Metro Anglo 1998 
Sara Lee Courtaulds Textiles  Anglo 2000 
Cadbury  Schweppes Pernod Anglo 2001 
General Electric Company Unison Industries Inc. Anglo 2002 
EnerSys Energy Storage Anglo 2002 
Tractebel Synatom Cont. 1994 
Bertelsmann Taurus Entertainment  Cont. 1997 
Deutsche Telekom Bertelsmann Cont. 1997 
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Table 1 
Simple Merger Taxonomy 
 
Merging Firms 
Gain 
Merging Firms 
Lose 
Value-enhancing 
Mergers 
 
Value-decreasing 
Mergers 
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Table 2 
Proposed Merger Taxonomy 
 
 
Merging Firms 
Gain 
Merging Firms 
Lose 
Rivals 
Gain 
Collusion-based 
Synergistic Mergers 
(Competitive-Complements) 
Non-synergistic 
Mergers 
(Competitive-Substitutes) 
Rivals 
Lose 
Efficiency-based 
Synergistic Mergers 
(Competitive-Substitutes) 
Pre-emptive 
Mergers 
(Competitive-Complements) 
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Table 3 
The Means for the Estimated CARs 
 
Continental-European Anglo-Saxon All 
Mergers Mergers Mergers Sample 
(Obs. 46) (Obs. 58) (Obs. 104) 
56-day 56-day 56-day Event Window 
(-50,+5) (-50,+5) (-50,+5) 
-0.0008 0.0009 0.0002 Acquirer 
(0.0202) (0.0172) (0.0131) 
0.0596 0.0983 0.0814 Target 
(0.0275) (0.0245) (0.0182) 
Merging Firms 0.0045 0.0227 0.0108 
(weighted) (0.0181) (0.0184) (0.0130) 
Rival Firms 0.0013 0.0039 0.0016 
(weighted) (0.0125) (0.0116) (0.0084) 
 
 
Notes: The mean value of the average estimated CAR employing the 56-day window (50,5) is reported in the 
first line, and standard errors are reported on the second line in parentheses. For merging firms and rival firms, 
the individual CARs are weighted with the respective market value.  
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Table 4 
Merger Taxonomy for Anglo-Saxon Mergers 
 
 Merging Firms 
Gain 
Merging Firms 
No-Effect 
 
Merging Firms 
Lose 
Total 
 
Rivals  
Gain 
 
13 (22.41%) 
Collusion-based 
Synergistic Mergers 
 
3 (5.17%) 9 (15.52%) 
Non-synergistic 
Mergers 
 
25 (43.10%) 
Rivals  
No-Effect 
 
0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 3 (5.17%) 3 (5.17%) 
Rivals 
Lose 
 
15 (25.86%) 
Efficiency-based 
Synergistic Mergers 
 
1 (1.72%) 14 (24.14%) 
Pre-emptive 
Mergers 
 
30 (51.72%) 
Total 28 (48.28%) 4 (6.90%) 26 (44.83%) 58 (100%) 
 
Notes: We measure profitability by means of the 56-day CAR window. The first number in each cell reflects how 
many such merger-type observations are in the sample, while the second number – in parentheses – refers to the 
percentage of all observations the cell represents. 
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Table 5 
Merger Taxonomy for Continental-European Mergers 
 
 Merging Firms 
Gain 
Merging Firms 
No-Effect 
 
Merging Firms 
Lose 
Total 
 
Rivals  
Gain 
 
13 (28.26%) 
Collusion-based 
Synergistic Mergers 
 
1 (2.17%) 9 (19.57%) 
Non-synergistic 
Mergers 
 
23 (50.00%) 
Rivals  
No-Effect 
 
1 (2.17%) 0 (0.00%) 1 (2.17%) 2 (4.35%) 
Rivals 
Lose 
 
8 (17.39%) 
Efficiency-based 
Synergistic Mergers 
 
0 (0.00%) 13 (28.26%) 
Pre-emptive 
Mergers 
 
21 (45.65%) 
Total 22 (47.83%) 1 (2.17%) 23 (50.00%) 46 (100%) 
 
Notes: We measure profitability by means of the 56-day CAR window. The first number in each cell reflects how 
many such merger-type observations are in the sample, while the second number – in parentheses – refers to the 
percentage of all observations the cell represents. 
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